Ranj Alaaldin
guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 16 June 2010 11.59 BST
Over the past month Iran has continuously and relentlessly shelled villages along its border with Iraqi Kurdistan, displacing thousands, wounding many and killing one 14-year-old girl.
The ostensible target of these attacks is the Party for Free Life in Kurdistan, an Iranian-Kurdish militant movement known as Pejak. However, the decision to send military units across the border and establish bases (according to Kurdish sources) could be part of a broader Iranian strategy to maintain a long-term physical presence inside Kurdish territory. At the very least it is a provocative measure that Iran may justify on the basis of what it considers to be a threat posed by Pejak, but the reasons may go beyond this.
Cross-border incursions (shelling included) have been a convenient way for neighbouring states to send a subtle message to Iraq’s political actors. This includes reminding them of the limitations on the level of success they can achieve, particularly as American troops withdraw.
Turkey has been a repeat offender in this respect; it still shells the region but, in comparison with previous years, has backed down a little. Back in December, Iranian forces carried out an incursion into disputed Iraqi territory in the south, just days after Iraq awarded leading international energy companies contracts to operate seven oil fields in the country. That may have been a response to Iraq’s attractive energy sector, which has the potential to take investors away from Iran and towards Baghdad.
In relation to the Kurds, Iran will be concerned about any Kurdish move to form a coalition with the anti-Iran bloc, the Iraqi National Movement, which marginally won Iraq’s parliamentary elections last March. It will also be looking to make sure that all is not perfect for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
Kurdistan continues to make progress and attract international investors, as exemplified by London’s hosting of a Kurdistan-focused investment conference, while President Barzani’s recent trip to Turkey suggests that relations with neighbouring states are also improving.
Then there is the new Erbil international airport – Kurdistan’s latest asset, which is also central to its future security, political and economic plans. As it stands, military aircraft have also been using the airport, though none have been combative. Iran, however, will be aware that the airport – a former military base which has the world’s fourth longest runway – could potentially serve as a useful strategic asset for not just the KRG, but also the KRG’s allies and Iran’s foes (the US and Israel).
Geographically, though, Kurdistan may be too close to Iran for the airport to be used for anything other than civilian purposes; with the KRG unprotected and unlikely to be supported by its so-called allies, Iran might well be in a position to shut the airport down if doing so appeared to be in its interests.
Similarly, if we ask what Iraq can actually do to prevent the recent Iranian shelling, the answer is nothing. Despite protests from President Barzani and the Iraqi government, as well as a rare declaration of solidarity with the Kurds from the Iraqi army, the Iranians can continue their bombardment indefinitely and with impunity, and may be keen to remind the Americans, and indeed the Kurds, of their power to do so.
Iraq is not the military power it once was and without military support from the west it would struggle in a head-to-head war with its neighbours. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, for example, puts the number of Iraqi security personnel at 578,269, but more than half of this is comprised of interior ministry personnel who are largely trained to take on domestic security challenges, rather than foreign. The country’s army, meanwhile, consists of nearly 200,000 personnel, in addition to a navy of 2,000 and an air force of 3,000.
Iran, on the other hand, has up to 350,000 active-duty army troops, 125,000 naval personnel and 18,000 air force personnel who are backed by 125,000 troops in the elite Revolutionary Guard Corps and 350,000 reservists. Other states able to outmuscle Iraq militarily include Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia.
Of course, none of these states would be able to successfully execute a full-scale war on Iraq. Wary of Iraq’s potential to become a powerful, democratic regional player, they can, however, ensure that it remains weak and divided through the more convenient (some might say cowardly) tools including shelling, the facilitation of mass terror attacks, and headline-grabbing military incursions – and this suits them just fine.
Source: Guardian
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