The Illusion of Inclusion
As Iran faces renewed nationwide uprising, many have turned their eyes to Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the last Shah, framing him as a potential alternative to the Islamic Republic. On the surface, Pahlavi presents himself as a pro-democracy figure committed to national unity and frequently speaks about his desire to return to Iran and stand with the people. He also claims to have a comprehensive five-part plan for reclaiming and rebuilding the country, which he describes as a roadmap for governance after the fall of the current regime. Relying on broad slogans of democracy, secularism, and inclusion in national governance, he appeals to ethnic groups such as Ahwazi Arabs, Baluchis, Kurds, Turks etc., urging them to join the movement to remove the Islamic Republic while. Yet he provides no concrete guarantees for how their political, cultural, or linguistic rights would be protected. While he explicitly opposes separatism, he remains vague on autonomy, self-determination, local governance, and historical grievances endured by these groups, such as the 1925 incorporation of Ahwaz without the consent of its people.
The ambiguity of Pahlavi’s plan for ethnic groups raises a key question: is this vagueness because his plan includes no real and genuine provisions for these groups’ rights, or is it a deliberate strategy designed to project inclusivity while maintaining the same patterns of centralized control? If the former is true, excluding minorities from the transitional plan not only reflects a lack of inclusivity but also raises serious doubts about his ability to maintain stability, protect the rights of all ethnic groups, and ensure fair representation and participation in
post-regime governance. Not having a real, concrete plan for these ethnic groups while simultaneously speaking about inclusion and democracy mirrors the rhetoric of the current regime, which often talks about equality but continues to marginalize diverse ethnic groups in practice. This approach is likely to perpetuate marginalization and lead to social unrest after the regime’s fall. If the latter is true, meaning he deliberately relies on vague promises to gain support from diverse ethnic groups for regime change while avoiding any real commitment to reforms or guarantees for their rights, it suggests that he intends to continue the historical patterns of exclusion and marginalization long faced by non-Persian communities in Iran. In other words, this approach allows him to maintain a centralized, Persian-dominated system under a new leader while preserving the appearance of legitimacy and national unity.
Whether the former or the latter is true, both indicate a tendency to prioritize central control and Persian dominance over genuine inclusivity, casting serious doubt on his ability to lead a truly multinational Iran. This tendency becomes even clearer when examining his speeches. For instance, in 2019, Pahlavi articulated a distinctly Persian-centric view on language policy: “I still do not understand the logic of education in the mother tongue… Every country’s education system has a key language, and as far as I recall, in Iran this language was Persian” he said, adding that full mother-tongue education could “create problems for unified technical training.
These remarks reveal a hierarchical linguistic order in which Persian is elevated as the central axis of the state, while all other ethnic languages are marginalized and treated as inferior.
By ignoring successful multilingual systems in countries such as Norway, which supports Sami languages; Finland, which manages both Swedish and Finnish; Switzerland, which functions with four official languages; and India, which recognizes 22 scheduled languages alongside Hindi and English, Pahlavi overlooks examples showing that multilingual societies can function effectively while protecting the rights of ethnic and linguistic communities. His approach reflects the continuation of a centralized, Persian-dominated system rather than a genuine commitment to inclusive governance. The question is thus straightforward: Can someone who, in practice, refuses to confront the diversity of Iran’s population be trusted to bring the country together?
Based on analyzing his own statements, the answer appears to be no.
Ethnic groups, therefore, cannot rely on the central government to grant them their rights; they must actively claim and defend these rights themselves. Historical experience shows that acting alone is rarely effective, and lasting stability and democracy emerge when leaders from different communities and different groups work together, rather than focusing solely on their own group. If each group pursues its interests in isolation, the central government can easily isolate or suppress them. Only by coordinating across ethnic communities and creating a unified platform for their shared demands can these groups build collective power, gain leverage, and secure the long-overdue rights that have been consistently denied. A historical example can be found in Norway in 1814, where leaders from across the country, representing very different regions, social classes, and political traditions, came together to draft a constitution and granted diverse communities meaningful participation in governance.The fruits of that collaboration can be seen today in a country that stands as a fully democratic state. Similarly, Iran’s ethnic groups must come together to demand constitutional guarantees for their cultural, educational, and political rights. Without cooperation and coordination among ethnic groups, they are likely to remain marginalized, and any post-regime government, regardless of who comes to power, may continue the same patterns of exclusion.
Retaj
